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OUR IMPERILED ABSOLUTIST FIRST AMENDMENT 
Zachary S. Price* 
ABSTRACT 
For roughly half a century, First Amendment doctrine has provided Americans with unusually expansive protection 
for freedom of expression.  In the wake of the divisive 2016 presidential election, this symposium contribution offers 
some tentative reflections on whether and how the current judicial consensus supporting this doctrinal structure could 
unravel—and why it may be particularly important in the current moment to prevent that from happening. 
This Article pursues this inquiry, first, by highlighting the current understanding’s historical emergence against the 
backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement.  The Article then explores three salient recent developments that could 
place increasing pressure on the current consensus view: (1) the problem of “fake news,” meaning deliberate 
propagation of manifestly false news stories that shape public opinion; (2) the apparent disinhibition of bigoted 
and hateful expression; and (3) the ongoing risk of both foreign and domestic terrorism and political violence more 
generally.  Although speech-repressive solutions to these problems may well gain increasing popular appeal, weak-
ening First Amendment protection in any of these areas could open the door to highly selective and discriminatory 
enforcement at different levels of government in our sharply divided polity.  At the same time, because different 
sides of our divided polity hold divergent perceptions of what speech is most dangerous, erosion along any of these 
axes could increase pressure for reciprocal changes along the others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For roughly half a century, First Amendment doctrine has provided 
Americans with exceptionally broad protection for freedom of expression.  
To a degree that is unusual around the world, even among other constitu-
tional democracies, American constitutional law generally protects expres-
sion of even the most hateful, offensive, illiberal, and dangerous ideas.1  This 
First Amendment absolutism, moreover, has been a striking point of judicial 
consensus, even on our current, badly fractured Supreme Court.  To be sure, 
judges and justices have disagreed sharply on some important implications 
of this principle, most notably the scope of constitutional protection for cam-
paign finance2 and commercial advertising.3  Yet the core notion that “[t]he 
First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea”4—and indeed 
that this broad freedom of belief and expression is a structural imperative of 
democratic self-government5—has been a principle that Justices Alito6 and 
Ginsburg,7 or in an earlier day Justices Rehnquist8 and Brennan,9 could 	
 1 See infra Part I. 
 2 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (holding that a ban on 
independent election-related expenditures by for-profit corporations violated the First Amendment). 
 3 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (holding that statutory restrictions on 
the sale, disclosure, and use of records revealing the prescribing practices of doctors violated the 
First Amendment). 
 4 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)). 
 5 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more 
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 74–75 (1964))).  See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1097, 1098 (2016) (describing “broad consensus” among scholars and on the Supreme Court 
that “the primary—albeit not necessarily the only—reason why the First Amendment protects free-
dom of speech is to advance democratic self-governance”). 
 6 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[ T ]he public expression 
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969))). 
 7 Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.) (“It is uncontested and uncontestable 
that government officials may not exclude from public places persons engaged in peaceful expres-
sive activity solely because the government actor fears, dislikes, or disagrees with the views those 
persons express.”). 
 8 Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“‘[ I ]f it is the speaker’s opinion that gives 
offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.  For it is a central 
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of 
ideas.’” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978))). 
 9 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 	
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agree on.  Just last year, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed it as 
First Amendment “bedrock.”10 
But in the longer term how stable is this consensus?  Could it be 
imperiled?  In other areas of our public life, previously settled good-
governance norms and constitutional understandings seem to be undergoing 
steady erosion, as partisan animus drives us along a downward spiral of tit-
for-tat degradation.  In the separation-of-powers context (the focus of my 
own scholarship11), numerous important long-unresolved questions—
including questions about recess appointments, recognition power, treaty 
confirmation, senatorial obligation to consider nominees, and faithful 
execution—have lately come to the fore (and often required judicial 
resolution) as each side’s clawing for position has stripped away buffers of 
convention and self-restraint that previously spared us from reaching bare 
questions of legality.12  With respect to the First Amendment, much the same 
process may already be evident with respect to non-judicial protections for 
free expression, as evidenced by such disparate phenomena as violent 
disruption of controversial speakers on university campuses, apparent 
declining popular support for free expression, and the current President’s 
statements celebrating violence against protesters and journalistic critics. 
Could this process extend as well to judicial doctrines?  Although the 
Constitution insulates federal courts from direct political pressure, for better 
or worse judges have never been entirely immune to the intellectual climate 
of their times; nor do they control the social conditions that generate cases 
presented to them.13  This brief and modest symposium Article thus offers 	
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
 10 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (identifying as a “bedrock First Amendment 
principle” that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend”); id. 
at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Aside from [certain] narrow exceptions [for categories of unpro-
tected speech], it is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that the government may not 
punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.”). 
 11 See generally Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014) 
(analyzing limits on executive enforcement discretion); Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Sep-
aration of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357 (2018) (discussing Congress’s authority to control executive 
powers through funding constraints); Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 937 (2017) (assessing whether due process principles protect reliance on federal nonen-
forcement policies). 
 12 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (interpreting Recess Appointments 
Clause); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (addressing scope of Presi-
dent’s recognition power); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (addressing scope 
of executive immigration nonenforcement authority), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 
(2016); Jonathan H. Adler, The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation to Consider Nominees, 24 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 15 (2016) (addressing question whether Senate had duty to consider Supreme 
Court nominee); Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agree-
ments, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 371 (2016) (addressing questions regarding absence of Senate con-
firmation for controversial recent international agreements). 
 13 The precise relationship between public opinion and judicial decision-making is a complex topic 	
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some tentative reflections on whether and how the expansive character of 
existing First Amendment doctrine might come under increasing pressure—
and why it may be particularly important in the current moment to prevent 
that from happening.   
I pursue this inquiry here along two dimensions.  First, to place current 
developments in context, I highlight the historical circumstances under 
which expansive protection for expressive freedom took hold in this country.  
In my view, whether current doctrine is correct should ultimately turn on 
consideration of first principles and objective legal analysis.  Nevertheless, 
the fact is that, as a matter of judicial enforcement, the First Amendment 
largely lay dormant until the late 1930s and 1940s.  What is more, it took on 
its now-familiar absolutist cast only in the 1960s and 1970s, against the back-
drop of the Civil Rights Movement.  I developed these thoughts for a sym-
posium panel entitled “Free Speech as a Response to Hate Crimes.”  In some 
sense, our bedrock First Amendment doctrine was just that: we gained ex-
pansive First Amendment freedoms (and diverged from other western de-
mocracies in the breadth of this protection) in response to the atrocities of 
Jim Crow.14  (As a useful if imprecise shorthand, I use the terms “absolutist,” 
“absolute,” and “near-absolute” throughout this Article to describe the doc-
trinal structure, described in more detail in Part I below, that requires gov-
ernment neutrality with respect to even the most contemptible ideas, subject 
only to narrow categorical exceptions.) 
This history is worth emphasizing in its own right, yet past contingency 
also highlights the possibility of future change, and recent political develop-
ments in both the United States and Europe should make clear that continued 
governmental support for civil liberties is hardly inevitable.15  My second ob-
jective in this Article is thus to explore—tentatively and speculatively—several 
recent developments in American society and culture that might place pres-
sure on the current judicial consensus supporting broad expressive freedom. 
	
addressed in a voluminous literature.  For evidence of some connection between public opinion 
and Supreme Court decisions, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1st ed. 2009) (“[O]ver time, as Americans have the opportunity to think 
through constitutional issues, Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judg-
ment of the American people.”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5 (2004) (“This book argues that 
because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate, constitutional interpretation almost in-
evitably reflects the broader social and political context of the times.”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown 
and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005) (presenting evidence that “may 
suggest that the Court’s legitimacy flows less from the soundness of its legal reasoning than from its 
ability to predict future trends in public opinion”). 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 For a recent comparative study of pathways to constitutional retrogression, see generally Aziz Huq 
& Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018). 
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Although one could surely point to other changes as well, I highlight three 
developments in American society that emerged out of the divisive 2016 na-
tional election: (1) the problem of “fake news,” by which I mean deliberate 
propagation, particularly through social media, of demonstrably untrue fac-
tual assertions that nonetheless shape public opinion; (2) the apparent (or at 
least perceived) disinhibition, particularly on the internet but also now in pub-
lic demonstrations, of hateful and bigoted expression; and (3) the ongoing risk 
of both foreign and domestic terrorism and political violence more generally. 
I emphasize these three issues because all were particularly salient follow-
ing the 2016 election (when the remarks on which this Article is based were 
prepared), because all are hard problems with no easy solution, and because 
all three may implicate existing pressure-points in the doctrine—areas where 
case law permits plausible arguments for weaker protection, and indeed 
where substantial arguments exist that more limited expressive freedom 
could be consistent with some set of principled First Amendment protec-
tions.16  The risk I see in each of these areas is precisely that, whatever the 
benefits of weakening protection, doing so could carry considerable costs.  
Within our sharply divided polity, weakening protection in any of these ar-
eas—for false statements, offensive expression, or incitement of violence—
could open the door to highly selective and discriminatory enforcement, as 
officials on one side or the other of our political divide cherry-pick statements 
they find most objectionable for repression.  In addition, precisely because 
each side of our divided polity may hold quite different intuitions about what 
speech is most dangerous or worthy of repression, erosion of protection along 
any of these axes could produce reciprocal changes along the others. 
I intend this exploration to be cautionary rather than predictive, and it is 
not my purpose here to defend every feature of current First Amendment 
doctrine.  Perhaps we could tolerate minor adjustments in the core First 
Amendment principles I address; though I am skeptical, perhaps some ad-
justments would even be merited.  If we are going to travel down this path, 
however, we should do so with our eyes open to the risks.  The great virtue 
of the current absolutist approach in First Amendment doctrine is precisely 
the clarity of the rule it enforces.  By tightly cabining the exceptions to First 
Amendment protection, current doctrine squarely protects overheated rhet-
oric on all sides, thus leaving wide and unambiguous protection for the rest 
of us.  Given current high political passions, such protection strikes me as a 
valuable heritage that we abandon at our peril.17 
	
 16 See infra Part III. 
 17 I address here only the expressive rights of United States citizens and speakers within the United 
States.  Whether equivalent protections apply to expression aimed at the United States by hostile 
overseas actors is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
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My discussion proceeds as follows.  I begin in Part I with a very brief 
overview of existing First Amendment doctrine.  I emphasize ways in which 
current doctrine protects expression of even the most outrageous ideas, while 
at the same time leaving the door open to government punishment when 
hateful ideas manifest themselves in concrete criminal or discriminatory con-
duct.  Part II then sketches the historical path that brought us to this point.  
It highlights in particular the civil rights context in which this absolutist form 
of protection took hold in the United States, even as it failed to do so in other 
Western democracies.  Part III then addresses the three developments noted 
earlier that could weaken the consensus supporting this doctrine and open 
pathways to reciprocal erosion of expressive protection.  The Article ends 
with a brief conclusion highlighting the value of the existing doctrine in our 
unsettled current moment. 
I.  A CURSORY OVERVIEW OF FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
The “soul” of our First Amendment, as one leading First Amendment 
lawyer recently put it, is its “anti-censorial” character—its radical insistence, 
at least when expression relating to political ideas and social movements is at 
stake, that “the dangers of permitting the government to decide what may 
and may not be said, far more often than not, outweigh any benefits that may 
result from suppressing or punishing offensive speech.”18  In doctrinal terms, 
two basic principles embody this anti-censorial soul. 
 First, as a general rule, the First Amendment demands strict governmen-
tal neutrality between topics and ideas.  Any governmental restriction based 
on what is said—the speech’s “content,” meaning either viewpoint or subject-
matter—must generally satisfy “strict scrutiny,” which requires demonstrat-
ing that the law is narrowly drawn to achieving some compelling governmen-
tal purpose.19  Federal and state governments may impose some reasonable 
“time, place, or manner” restrictions on expressive activities.20  They may, for 	
 18 FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at xiv, xvii (2017).  As Frederick Schauer 
has observed, the First Amendment’s threshold boundaries—what verbal acts trigger First Amend-
ment scrutiny to begin with—may be harder to characterize, although in general expression relat-
ing to public normative and political questions most clearly implicates the First Amendment.  See 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Sali-
ence, 117 HARV. L. REV.  1765, 1766–67, 1801–02 (2004) (noting difficulty of determining “thresh-
old applicability” and suggesting, based on prior work by Kent Greenawalt, that “the First Amend-
ment plainly appears to be implicated . . . when the defendant’s speech is public rather than face-
to-face, when it is inspired by the speaker’s desire for social change rather than for private gain, 
when it relates to something general rather than to a specific transaction, and when it is normative 
rather than informational in content”). 
 19 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786, 805 (2011). 
 20 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 	
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example, limit the size and placement of outdoor signs or the timing of pro-
tests in public streets and parks.21  But any such restriction must be content-
neutral; it may not discriminate based on the message being expressed.22  
What is more, permitting requirements for public protests may not give undue 
discretion to those administering them, nor may they impose differential fees 
on protesters based on the likely audience response to the message (and re-
sulting need for police protection or other public services).23 
At the same time, as a second countervailing principle, the Court has 
identified certain categories of expression (often defined in part by their con-
tent) that are either unprotected or subject to lesser degrees of protection.24  
Examples include obscene speech, fraudulent utterances, certain defamatory 
statements, and “fighting words” (face-to-face personal insults).25  The Court 
has generally defined these exceptions narrowly,26 and in recent cases it has 
seemed to call a halt to further recognition of more.27  Nevertheless, several 
such categories are relevant here. 
Most notably, “incitement,” meaning advocacy of illegal violence, may 
be punished, but only within the confines of the narrow standard articulated 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio:   
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit 
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.28   
Similarly, threats of violence or illegal conduct may be punished, but the 
Court has limited this category to “statements where the speaker means to 
	
 21 Id.; Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806–08 (1984).   
 22 Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. 
 23 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130–31, 133–34 (1992). 
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (listing examples and collecting 
cases); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012) (plurality opinion) (listing ex-
amples and collecting cases). 
 25 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69.  Though “fighting words” are listed in Alvarez 
as an unprotected category, other recent cases suggest that any remaining “fighting words” excep-
tion is exceedingly narrow.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (barring tort liability 
for offensive protest even though “a few of the signs—such as ‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God 
Hates You’—were viewed as containing messages related to [the plaintiffs] specifically”); see also 
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 906 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (dissenting from vacatur 
and remand in a case where the Court’s decision apparently rejected the view that “a verbal assault 
on an unwilling audience may be so grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be the proper 
subject of criminal proscription”). 
 26 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69 (stressing the “limited” and “narrow[ ]” character of exceptions). 
 27 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790, 792–93 (2011) (declining to exempt 
violent video games from First Amendment protection); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–70 (declining to 
recognize exception for certain depictions of animal cruelty). 
 28 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 	
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communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”29 
Liability for some false or defamatory statements also remains possible, 
but an elaborate body of cases stemming from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
blocks even private tort liability for many false statements about public offi-
cials or public figures (specifically, those propagated without “actual malice,” 
meaning either knowledge of their falsity or reckless indifference to their 
truth).30  As for false statements more generally, a recent plurality opinion 
applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a restriction on certain non-defamatory 
false statements,31 but a narrower concurring opinion appeared to leave the 
government broader latitude to restrict some false statements under a more 
open-ended balancing test.32  The Court has more clearly rejected any gen-
eral exception to protection for offensive speech.  In addition, although it 
once upheld a prohibition on “group libel” (what we would today call “hate 
speech”),33 more recent decisions have effectively repudiated this exception, 
lumping racist invective into the general category of offensive expression that 
remains protected unless it falls within some other unprotected category such 
as incitement, threats, or fighting words.34 
Modern First Amendment doctrine thus provides near-absolute protec-
tion for expression of ideas, no matter how hateful, offensive, indecent, or 
illiberal.  Bigots and radicals of all stripes fall under the First Amendment’s 
banner, but by the same token so do flag-burners, anti-police activists, perse-
cuted minorities, and others whom beleaguered, malicious, or intolerant 
public officials might wish to repress. 
The doctrine, moreover, balances its near-absolute protection for expres-
sion of ideas with near-absence of protection for concrete criminal or dis-
criminatory actions.  Accordingly, although abstract expression of bigoted 
views is protected, the government is free to impose enhanced sentences on 	
 29 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 
(1969) (per curiam) (rejecting prosecution for the “political hyperbole” of a draft protester’s state-
ment that “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.”); 
cf. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (interpreting a federal threat statute to 
require threatening intent and thus avoiding First Amendment issues). 
 30 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring proof of “actual malice” 
in defamation suits brought by public officials); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
342 (1974) (extending the actual malice standard to public figures in general).  
 31 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 32 Id. at 730–32 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 33 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1952) (allowing criminal liability for “wilful purvey-
ors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups”). 
 34 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (plurality opinion) (striking down a statutory 
provision that prohibited registering disparaging trademarks); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (invalidating a city ordinance that specifically punished “bias-motivated” 
fighting words (internal quotation marks omitted)). 	
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bias-motivated crimes,35 to proscribe various forms of discrimination in em-
ployment and commercial dealings,36 and to punish criminal conspiracies 
motivated by political beliefs.37  It may even use protected expression as evi-
dence to establish particular proscribed motivations.38  Although some have 
questioned this distinction’s coherence,39 modern free expression case law 
thus seeks to balance two central imperatives of democratic self-govern-
ment—guaranteeing personal and public security, on the one hand, and pro-
tecting freedom of opinion, on the other—by drawing a sharp line between 
expression and action, word and deed. 
II.  CONTINGENT ORIGINS 
How did we get to this place?  According to one recent comparative survey, 
both sides of the American doctrine regarding intolerant speech—the degree of 
protection for expression and the degree of proscription for bias-motivated 
conduct—appear distinctive among other advanced democracies.40  Simply 
put, other western democracies may often allow broader punishment for hate 
speech and incitement of violence, but may also impose less vigorous restrictions 
on bias-motivated conduct.41  This anomalousness notwithstanding, whether 	
 35 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993) (upholding enhanced penalties for bias-
motivated criminal acts). 
 36 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t 
Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court has “implicitly acknowl-
edged” that the First Amendment provides no defense to workplace harassment claims).  
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 127 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a First Amendment 
challenge to a terrorism conspiracy conviction “where the appellants engaged in extensive conver-
sations . . . about the necessity of waging violent jihad and their shared goal of reaching the jihadist 
battlefield”). 
 38 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489 (indicating that a defendant’s speech can be used as evidence of a biased 
motive). 
 39 See, e.g., ERIK BLEICH, THE FREEDOM TO BE RACIST?: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM 109 (2011) (“Legal theorists and Su-
preme Court Justices have struggled with how to distinguish speech from conduct.”); cf. FREDERICK 
M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 89–102 (1999) (discuss-
ing “[t]he slipperiness of the speech-conduct distinction”).  For a defense of the speech-conduct 
distinction, see, for example, FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 4–9 (John K. Wilson ed. 1993) (“[I]t is necessary to distinguish speech from action if 
the First Amendment is to have any meaning other than the senseless proposition that the govern-
ment shall make no laws.”). 
 40 BLEICH, supra note 39, at 11 (characterizing the United States as “the major exception to the post-
war trend toward limiting freedom in favor of penalizing racism”); id. at 107–08 (indicating that 
“the United States was a leader in making racial discrimination and hate crimes illegal” and that 
although European governments have “followed in the United States’ footsteps,” these govern-
ments have “seldom” acted “with similar vigor” in “establishing laws against racial discrimination 
and hate crimes”). 
 41 Id. at 108; see also ABRAMS, supra note 18, at xv–xvii (comparing the types of speech that are protected 
by the First Amendment in the United States with those protected in other democratic nations). 	
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American First Amendment doctrine is correct ultimately turns on questions of 
interpretive theory regarding our own distinctive constitutional text and 
tradition—questions far beyond the scope of this modest Article.  Assuming for 
present purposes that our basic doctrine is sound—or at least (as nearly every 
mainstream interpretive theory now recognizes) that overturning entrenched 
decisions should require an exceptionally powerful justification42—it 
nonetheless provides helpful context for current questions to appreciate the 
historical circumstances in which key building blocks of modern First 
Amendment doctrine were lain. 
Summarizing greatly, although the First Amendment of course was in-
cluded in the original Bill of Rights of 1791 and has featured in political and 
judicial debates over expressive freedom ever since, the robust judicial pro-
tection for free expression that we now enjoy first took hold in the 1930s and 
1940s, during the formative period for modern constitutional law following 
the New Deal.43  To be sure, progressive reaction to the federal government’s 
repression of subversive speech during World War I provided one important 
impetus for greater civil-liberties consciousness during the inter-war period.44  
Nevertheless, and despite recognizing in principle that speech posing no 
“clear and present danger” was constitutionally protected, the Supreme 
Court’s classic First Amendment decisions from the first decades of the twen-
tieth century were remarkably tolerant of government repression.45  As Laura 	
 42 For some recent discussion of the appropriate force of precedent, see generally RANDY J. KOZEL, 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017) (offering a general theory of stare 
decisis).  See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2358–61 (2015) 
(addressing the force of precedent within originalist interpretive theory). 
 43 The historical account offered in this paragraph draws heavily from LAURA WEINRIB, THE 
TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016) [hereinafter 
WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH].  For some other classic historical accounts, see, for 
example, ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (1st ed. 2004).  On 
the connection between First Amendment freedom and other central features of post-New Deal 
constitutional law, see Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 
321 (2014) (noting that “[s]trong judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights is properly regarded as 
a keystone of the New Deal settlement,” with other key elements being “a relaxation of structural 
constraints on Congress’s control over the economy” and “an invigoration of constitutional protec-
tions for ‘discrete and insular minorities’ along with free speech” (footnote omitted) (citing LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 122 (2004))).  Capturing the basic logic of this constitutional understanding, Weinrib ob-
serves: “judicial deference to the outcome of democratic processes requires robust debate, with 
ample protection for minority interests, as state policy is formulated and implemented.”  Id. at 321–
22 (citing MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF 
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 158–59 (1991)). 
 44 WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 43, at 4–5. 
 45 STONE, supra note 43, at 192–211 (discussing key post-World War I Supreme Court cases that 
interpreted the First Amendment). 	
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Weinrib has recently shown, more robust, counter-majoritarian judicial pro-
tection took hold only later, against the backdrop of fascism’s rise around the 
world, as key elements of the American labor movement shed their Lochner-
era hostility towards courts and sought constitutional protection for rights of 
protest.46  An intellectual consensus supporting judicial enforcement of the 
First Amendment thus “grew out of a state-skeptical brand of labor radical-
ism, grafted onto a conservative legal tradition of individual rights.”47 
Even with this groundwork in place, however, Supreme Court decisions 
from the 1930s to 1950s were decidedly mixed regarding the extent of First 
Amendment protection for potentially violent illiberal groups.48  In Beauharnais 
v. Illinois in 1952, for example, the Court upheld a state law forbidding what 
we would now call “hate speech.”49  (Using terminology from David Riesman’s 
scholarship on fascist subversion of European democracies, the Court at the 
time called it “group libel” and lumped it together with individualized libel as 
a form of unprotected expression.50)  With memories of fascist and communist 
revolutions in Europe fresh in their minds, some of the Court’s leading liberals, 
particularly Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, worried openly about the degree 
to which our Constitution should protect advocacy by groups bent on 
destroying it.51 	
 46 WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 43, at 11. 
 47 Id. at 5; see also Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech & Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the 
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 96 (2000) (tracing the “emergence of the modern, liber-
tarian conception of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment” to post-war “changes in 
political culture” including economic growth, heightened fears of totalitarianism, and worries about 
“bureaucratic ineptitude”). 
 48 See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 146 (2006) (describing free speech doctrine between 1917 and 
1957, particularly with respect to subversive activities, as oscillating between liberal and “speech-
repressive” impulses). 
 49 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1952). 
 50 Id. at 259 n.9 (citing David Riesman, Democracy & Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. 
REV. 727 (1942)); see also David Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PUB. POL’Y 33, 53–
54 (1942) (discussing questions presented by allowing Nazis and Communists to freely advocate 
restricting the rights of other groups). 
 51 See, e.g., Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258–59 (Frankfurter, J.) (“Illinois did not have to look beyond her 
own borders or await the tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that wilful [sic] 
purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully 
to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot com-
munity.” (footnote omitted) (citing Karl Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism in Euro-
pean Democarcies, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 1085 (1938))); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382, 422 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing “the decisive differ-
ences between the Communist Party and every other party of any importance in the long experi-
ence of the United States with party government”); Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 23 
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (characterizing a rally as “a local manifestation of a world-wide and 
standing conflict between two organized groups of revolutionary fanatics, each of which has im-
ported to this country the strong-arm technique developed in the struggle by which their kind has 
devastated Europe”). 	
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First Amendment doctrine took on its now-familiar absolutist cast only in 
the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement.52  
Many foundational First Amendment decisions, including New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan,53 Street v. New York,54 Wood v. Georgia,55 and NAACP v. Button,56 were 
in fact civil rights decisions.  In Sullivan, for example, the Court interpreted 
the First Amendment to protect an open “interchange of ideas” by limiting 
defamation liability for criticism of public officials.57  But the decision’s imme-
diate effect was to shut down abusive litigation against civil rights leaders and 
northern newspapers by Jim Crow authorities.58  Likewise, in Street, the Court 
called it “firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of 
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive 
to some of their hearers,” yet it did so in a case where this principle supported 
invalidating a civil rights protester’s conviction for flag-burning.59  Even Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the 1972 decision establishing the rule of strict 
scrutiny for content-based limitations on expression, not only was itself a civil 
rights decision (the speaker in question was protesting racial discrimination), 
but also imported its framework for analyzing speech restrictions from earlier 
cases applying strict scrutiny to race-based legal classifications.60 
In his comparative study, Erik Bleich notes that the United States diverged 
from major European democracies with respect to its protection of hate speech 
during precisely this period.61  Bleich points to contemporary civil rights and 	
 52 For a discussion of interconnections between free speech and anti-discrimination case law, see 
MARK J. RICHARDS, THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE DECISIONS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 58–82 (2013).  See also, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Re-
thinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 42 (1996) (“During the 1950s 
and 1960s, free speech became intertwined in popular and legal consciousness with another sub-
stantive cause that was beginning to prosper—that of the civil rights movement.”). 
 53 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (addressing a libel suit against civil rights activists). 
 54 394 U.S. 576, 578, 594 (1969) (invalidating the appellant’s conviction for burning the flag in a civil 
rights protest). 
 55 370 U.S. 375, 379, 395 (1962) (invalidating a contempt-of-court conviction based on criticism of a 
grand-jury investigation that targeted African-American voters and activists). 
 56 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963) (protecting the associational rights of a civil rights advocacy group). 
 57 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 58 For background on this litigation campaign against the civil rights movement, see Christopher W. 
Schmidt, New York Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 
293, 295–96 (2014) [hereinafter Schmidt, Sullivan and the Legal Attack] (describing the impact of the 
segregationist countermovement on civil rights activity and the Supreme Court); see also Christopher 
W. Schmidt, Litigating Against the Civil Rights Movement, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (2015) (dis-
cussing legal defenses of Jim Crow more generally). 
 59 Street, 394 U.S. at 592. 
 60 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”).  For a discussion of the case’s background and its connection to 
racial equality concerns, see RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 1–5, 48–57. 
 61 BLEICH, supra note 39, at 74 (noting that, in the 1960s and 1970s, while “most European coun-
tries . . . were restricting speech that evoked the Nazi era or that tried to aggravate societal divisions 	
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antiwar dissident movements as a possible explanation.62  “During this volatile 
era” in the United States, Bleich observes, “protecting [minorities’ and dissi-
dents’] right to protest trumped any interest in restricting racist speech.”63 
Whatever the precise causal relationship between this historical context 
and the Court’s decision-making, the key point here is that the Court’s forma-
tive decisions guaranteeing a robust governmental neutrality between ideas 
must be understood against this civil rights backdrop.64  In Brandenburg, for ex-
ample, the Court’s narrow standard for incitement served to protect white su-
premacists’ violent rhetoric from government sanction,65 yet the Justices surely 
understood that in other cases dissidents and minorities of other sorts would 
benefit from its decision.  After all, as Michael Klarman rather cynically ob-
serves, the Court “supplied its most robust interpretations of the First Amend-
ment” only after “the complete collapse of the internal [Communist] subver-
sion threat in the 1960s” and substantial weakening of the Ku Klux Klan.66 
In the ensuing decades, as we have seen, the Supreme Court has by and 
large only built out still broader protections from this foundation.  Applying 
the rule of strict scrutiny for content-based limitations, courts have laid waste 
to everything from pornography restrictions67 and campaign finance limita-
tions68 to municipal signage ordinances69 and data privacy protections.70  
Categories of unprotected speech have shrunk down or disappeared,71 while 
the category of “speech” subject to First Amendment protection in the first 
place has steadily expanded.72  To some minds, this case law has slipped its 	
between groups,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s “decision[s] in those decades permitted aggressive, 
vituperative, or hateful speech, even when aimed at racial, ethnic, and religious groups”). 
 62 Id. at 75 (“The civil rights and antiwar movements . . . converged in the 1960s around the principle 
of free speech.” (footnote omitted)). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See, e.g., Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(on file with author) (noting the Supreme Court’s suspicion of southern juries as a motivating con-
sideration in developing modern speech-protective judicial doctrines); Schmidt, Sullivan and the Le-
gal Attack, supra note 58, at 313 (“[W]hen the legal attacks on the Civil Rights Movement made their 
way to the Supreme Court, the Justices were predisposed to come to the aid of those who were 
struggling to advance the cause of civil rights.”). 
 65 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (invalidating the conviction of a 
Ku Klux Klan member under a “Criminal Syndicalism” statute). 
 66 Klarman, supra note 52, at 36. 
 67 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986) (invalidating an anti-pornography ordinance). 
 68 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (invalidating restrictions on election-
related expenditures by corporations). 
 69 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (invalidating a town signage law). 
 70 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (invalidating a medical privacy law 
because the First Amendment protects “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing”). 
 71 See supra Part I. 
 72 See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 
1614–16 (2015) (describing the expansion of speech categories subject to First Amendment protection). 	
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moorings in some applications.73  Some also worry that the very expansion 
risks diluting the First Amendment’s meaning where it most matters.74  Ra-
ther than rehearse these concerns about the doctrine’s outermost projections, 
however, I will turn here to some speculative concerns about more novel 
threats to the bedrock itself. 
III.  A CONTINGENT FUTURE? 
Highlighting the historical circumstances in which First Amendment ab-
solutism took hold raises the question whether contemporary circumstances 
remain as conducive to maintaining these civil libertarian commitments.  For 
the moment, the core principle of neutrality between ideas seems stable; the 
Supreme Court just collectively reaffirmed it.75  Furthermore, because the 
First Amendment is so robustly judicially enforced, the existing judicial con-
sensus regarding its meaning should provide substantial protection for ex-
pressive freedom even if political support weakens.  Free expression is an area 
where judicial review’s counter-majoritarian power is real and important. 
Nevertheless, in the longer term, changes in the intellectual climate, the 
character of cases that come before the Court, or the social and technological 
contexts in which disputes arise could push First Amendment doctrine in less 
absolutist directions.  A major feature of our social and political context, 
moreover, is increasing partisan polarization and distrust.  This context could 
(and should, in my view) push each side to recognize the value of mutual 
toleration of opposing viewpoints, yet it may also drive each side towards 
increasingly intolerant and repressive attitudes.76  
We may already be seeing a sort of downward spiral with respect to First 
Amendment freedoms protected by norms and conventions rather than ju-
dicial doctrine.  Among other examples, apparent declining expectations of 
public disclosure and press questioning for presidents and presidential can-
didates, disruption of controversial speakers on college campuses, threats to 	
 73 See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 
1917–18 (2016) (criticizing emerging First Amendment challenges to economic regulations); Mor-
gan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1399–1400 (2017) (arguing that an emerging “libertarian” free speech 
jurisprudence gives undue protection to corporate expression). 
 74 Schauer, supra note 72, at 1635 (“When the coverage of the First Amendment expands . . . there is 
an increased possibility that, out of necessity, some of the existing doctrinal tools developed for a 
smaller area of coverage will have to be modified, possibly with unfortunate consequences.”). 
 75 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (plurality opinion) (invalidating registration re-
strictions for trademarks considered disparaging); id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (supporting 
the same result). 
 76 For an account of increasing partisan polarization generally, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. 
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY & UNEQUAL 
RICHES (2d ed. 2016). 	
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private communication from surveillance and data collection,77 and Presi-
dent Trump’s illiberal campaign rhetoric may all suggest declining commit-
ment to the First Amendment outside of courts.  In this modest Article, 
though, I will just highlight three areas where a process of reciprocal degra-
dation could conceivably take hold within judicial doctrine itself, even if that 
possibility still appears unlikely.  As noted earlier, I have selected the three 
areas I address here—fake news, hate speech, and terrorism—because they 
fall along arguable pressure points in the case law, places where at least in-
cremental adjustments in the degree of First Amendment protection seem 
possible, and maybe even desirable in the abstract.  I have also picked them 
because they are hard problems.  Threats from propagandistic manipulation, 
hateful advocacy, and terrorist violence are real; they may well be getting 
worse; and the burdens they impose are not necessarily distributed evenly 
across our society.  How to address them thoughtfully in a manner consistent 
with our constitutional traditions and the requirements of personal security 
and public order are issues that require much greater thought and atten-
tion—an enterprise to which this symposium contributed. 
The only theme I want to explore here is how addressing these problems 
as a matter of First Amendment doctrine could intersect in unfortunate ways 
with our current polarized political environment.  Whatever their faults, the 
great virtue of current narrow definitions of applicable First Amendment ex-
ceptions is the clarity of the rule they enforce.  By protecting overheated and 
exaggerated rhetoric on all sides, current doctrine cuts off risks of discrimina-
tory enforcement that otherwise could be quite pronounced amid current par-
tisan dynamics.  It also may prevent a certain downward spiral, in which weak-
ening the rule of broad expressive freedom along any one dimension produces 
greater pressure to weaken it along others.  Though these concerns are admit-
tedly quite speculative and uncertain, I will elaborate them briefly here by ad-
dressing each problem in turn and then reflecting on the broader dynamics. 
A.  Enlightenment Protections Without Enlightenment Minds 
A first possible threat to the current First Amendment absolutism is the 
recent apparent success of manifest falsehoods—“fake news”—in manipulat-
ing voters’ beliefs during the 2016 campaign.  This new and troubling devel-
opment, which is largely a function of new internet technologies and social 
media, presents both a long-term intellectual risk and a more immediate 
practical concern regarding expressive freedom.78 
	
 77 On this concern, see generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of 
Big Data: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1279 (2015). 
 78 For an overview of social media technology’s role in the 2016 presidential campaign, see Nathaniel 
Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 64–69 (2017). 
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To start with the intellectual risk, continued success of internet propaganda 
in shaping beliefs could easily induce widespread corrosive cynicism about the 
value of free expression.  One classic justification for free speech has always 
been a notion that open debate will enable truth and justice to prevail.  Though 
recognizing that truth will not necessarily gain immediate acceptance, John 
Stuart Mill famously argued in On Liberty that “collision with error” may pro-
duce a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth” and that  
when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, 
but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover 
it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable 
circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to with-
stand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.79   
Two centuries earlier, the poet John Milton put the point still more emphat-
ically.  “Let [Truth] and Falshood grapple,” Milton argued in a classic de-
fense of free expression; “who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and 
open encounter?”80 
These assertions, which the Supreme Court invoked in a key free speech 
decision,81 reflect a certain Enlightenment optimism that underlies important 
features of our institutions, the First Amendment included.  If people are only 
given freedom to make their own choices, determine their own beliefs, and 
govern themselves, then over time government policy will converge around 
desirable outcomes rooted in sound empirical judgments.82 
But it turns out we have Enlightenment institutions without Enlightenment 
minds.  Open debate may well be a necessary precondition for truth’s emer-
gence, but it is hardly sufficient; human beings’ views are often governed by 
considerations of interest, emotion, and cognitive bias rather than objective ra-
tionality.  We now have the benefit of whole literatures demonstrating this 
point.  Even apart from longstanding romantic, theological, and materialist cri-
tiques of human rationality, psychological and behavioral economics research 
has demonstrated our minds’ fallibility in rich detail,83 while political scientists 	
 79 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33, 54 (London, John W. Parker & Son 1859). 
 80 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (1644). 
 81 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964). 
 82 Cf. MILL, supra note 79 (“As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer dis-
puted or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be 
measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncon-
tested.”).  But see HAIMAN, supra note 39, at 7 (arguing, with reference to Mill, that “a free and 
unfettered marketplace of ideas is the best way to conduct a search for truth—not because truth 
will always prevail over falsehood . . . but because there is ordinarily a better chance of approxi-
mating truth when ideas are challenged by competing ideas than when they are dogmatically as-
serted and accepted”). 
 83 For general accounts of this body of research, see, for example, DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, 
FAST AND SLOW (2011); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007); RICHARD H. THALER, 
MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2015). 	
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have shown how emotional attachments and group identities frequently over-
ride rational policy assessment in determining voting behavior.84 
Partisan polarization, moreover, appears to make these problems consid-
erably worse.  As a result of so-called “confirmation bias”—peoples’ ten-
dency to attend to assertions that confirm existing beliefs and discredit those 
that do not—voters’ perception of even basic facts often gets filtered through 
the distorting lenses of partisan attachment and suspicion of the other side’s 
good faith.85  At the same time, new technologies such as the internet, social 
media, and cable news today enable citizens to inhabit information worlds 
shaped predominantly by their partisan preconceptions.  In the internet con-
text, moreover, deceptive or manipulative communications may be targeted 
specifically at narrow groups considered likely to be receptive, and the com-
munications may not even be visible to outsiders (and thus subject to rebuttal) 
unless they are shared beyond the targeted circle of like-minded individuals.86 
The 2016 election cycle offered vivid evidence of these problems.  The 
build-up to the election witnessed an extraordinary profusion of fake news 
reports, particularly on social media.87  Many demonstrably untrue stories, 
some apparently manufactured and distributed by hostile actors overseas, 
took on a life of their own as social media sharing and computerized news-
feeds diffused such stories uncritically through networks of like-minded indi-
viduals.88  What precise impact such “fake news” stories had is unclear; some 	
 84 See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY 
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 232–38 (2016) (canvassing literature 
on this point). 
 85 See id. at 267–84, 294–96. 
 86 See, e.g., Philip Bump, The Investigation Goes Digital: Did Someone Point Russia to Specific Online Targets?, 
WASH. POST (July 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/12/ 
the-investigation-goes-digital-did-someone-point-russia-to-specific-online-targets/?utm_term=.7c50 
3b345469 (discussing targeted advertisements used by the Trump presidential campaign in 2016). 
 87 For general discussion of these developments, see Persily, supra note 78, at 67–71. 
 88 Id. at 68; see also, e.g., Amit Chowdhry, Facebook Launches a New Tool that Combats Fake News, FORBES 
(Mar. 5, 2017, 5:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2017/03/05/facebook-
fake-news-tool/#5e5bcb1e7ec1 (describing measures adopted by Facebook and Google to address 
the spread of false news stories during the 2016 election); Olivia Solon, Facebook Staff Mount Secret 
Push to Tackle Fake News, Reports Say, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016, 8:29 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/technology/2016/nov/14/facebook-fake-news-us-election-news-feed-algorithm (describ-
ing Facebook’s use of an “an algorithm that subsequently trended several fake stories”); Olivia So-
lon, In Firing Human Editors, Facebook Has Lost the Fight Against Fake News, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2016, 
4:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/29/facebook-trending-news-ed-
itors-fake-news-stories (discussing Facebook’s firing of human news editors in 2016 and suggesting 
that because “Facebook’s algorithm . . . decides which content people see in their news feeds, it is 
arguably irresponsible for the company to allow misinformation to spread unfettered when it is now 
so influential in the daily distribution of news”); Laura Sydell, We Tracked Down a Fake-News Creator 
in the Suburbs. Here’s What We Learned, NPR (Nov. 23, 2016, 3:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/alltechconsidered/2016/11/23/503146770/npr-finds-the-head-of-a-covert-fake-news-op-
eration-in-the-suburbs (describing the production and spread of false news stories). 	
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analysis suggests it was limited.89  Yet the problem may get worse.  New tech-
nology already enables production of manufactured conversations with real 
peoples’ voices, and such fake recordings will likely soon be indistinguishable 
from the real thing.90  Soon the answer to the Marx Brothers’ famous ques-
tion, “who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?,” may no longer 
be obvious.91  Objective validation of information may be more important 
than ever, yet at the same time public trust in traditional mediating institu-
tions like newspapers that could vet and verify claims is declining.92 
What is more, false claims in the 2016 cycle proved remarkably impervi-
ous to debunking.  The most salient falsehood suffices to illustrate this point.  
Donald Trump, who of course ultimately won the presidency, rose to politi-
cal prominence by ostentatiously associating himself with the “birther” 
movement that questioned whether President Barack Obama was born in 
the United States.93  He was (and even if he wasn’t, his right to citizenship 
from birth by virtue of his mother’s citizenship would have made him a “nat-
ural born citizen” eligible for the presidency).94  But it didn’t matter.  To this 
day, and even though Trump ultimately disclaimed the birther myth when 
it became politically inconvenient, polls suggest that more than a quarter of 
Americans believe Obama was definitely or probably born outside the 
United States.95  A political environment in which this outcome is possible is 
not one in which we can be confident that truth will come out ahead “in a 
free and open encounter.”96 
In my view, the human fallibility demonstrated by such examples does 
nothing to undermine the Supreme Court’s broad construction of First 	
 89 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 211, 232 (2017) (questioning whether fake news had a meaningful impact on the 
2016 election).  For some critical commentary on this study, see Persily, supra note 78, at 69–70. 
 90 See Natasha Lomas, Lyrebird Is a Voice Mimic for the Fake News Era, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/25/lyrebird-is-a-voice-mimic-for-the-fake-news-era/ (indicat-
ing that computerized voice mimicking that is “indistinguishable from the real thing” will be possi-
ble “in a matter of years” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexandre de Brébisson)). 
 91 DUCK SOUP (Paramount Productions 1933). 
 92 Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.gal-
lup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx. 
 93 For one account of this sorry episode in the midst of the campaign, see David A. Graham, An 
Unrepentant Trump Finally Acknowledges Obama as American, ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-birther/500327 (describing how 
“Trump spent five years fanning the racist conspiracy theory” that Obama was not born in the 
United States). 
 94 Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen,” 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
161, 161 (2015) (indicating the phrase “natural born citizen” means “someone who was a U.S. 
citizen at birth with no need to go through a naturalization proceeding at some later time”).  
 95 THE ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL, 2016, at 58 tbl. 50 (2016), https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloud-
front.net/cumulus_uploads/document/ljv2ohxmzj/econTabReport.pdf.  
 96 MILTON, supra note 80, at 35. 	
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Amendment freedoms.  On the contrary, it shows only that the truth-will-pre-
vail theory, though invoked in some key First Amendment decisions,97 was 
never adequate to justify the doctrine’s basic features.  Broad expressive free-
dom is better understood as a vital underpinning of popular sovereignty.  If the 
government must answer to the people, and not vice versa, then the people 
must remain free to formulate views, however misguided, that challenge gov-
ernment orthodoxy.  Indeed, some have argued that deep suspicion of govern-
ment—a fear that government officials themselves may misjudge public inter-
ests and seek to distort public opinion—provides the most cogent rationale for 
the reigning free speech absolutism.98  From that point of view, human vulner-
ability to deception and propaganda may only make it more imperative to keep 
the channels of communication open to competing viewpoints.  The best state-
ments of free speech absolutism have always recognized as much.99 
Nevertheless, popular acceptance of the Supreme Court’s free speech ab-
solutism could yield to corrosive cynicism if the problem of fake news and 
deliberate falsehood grows worse.  Simply put, if significant elements of the 
electorate—on whichever side—perceive truth as consistently losing in open 
debate, expressive freedom may lose some of its luster, and people might then 
develop less tolerant attitudes towards expression of views they perceive as 
untrue.  Polarization, moreover, may compound this problem: Americans’ 
	
 97 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (“[I]t is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 390 (1969))). 
 98 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) 
(“Not only the first amendment, but also the very idea of a principle of freedom of speech, is an 
embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of decisionmakers.”); cf. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective 
and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985) (arguing that “in adjudicating first 
amendment disputes and fashioning first amendment doctrines, courts ought to adopt what might 
be termed the pathological perspective,” meaning that “the overriding objective at all times should 
be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance 
of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle 
dissent systematically”); Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless 
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (advocating constitutional protection for some false 
statements based on an understanding that “the First Amendment is not, in the end, primarily 
about protecting the individual’s right to speak; rather, the First Amendment is primarily about 
constraining the collective authority of temporary political majorities to exercise their power by 
determining for everyone what is true and false, as well as what is right and wrong”). 
 99 The classic statement of this view, expressed with trademark fatalism, is from Justice Holmes’s dis-
sent in Gitlow v. New York: 
Every idea is an incitement. . . .  Eloquence may set fire to reason.  But . . . [i]f in the long 
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be 
given their chance and have their way. 
  268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 
F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a neces-
sary condition of freedom of speech.”), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).  
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increasing tribalism and resulting imperviousness to persuasion may discour-
age efforts at reasoned persuasion in the first place.  Such intolerance, in 
time, could then legitimate efforts to more actively manage public opinion in 
the name of truth, thus eroding consensus support for the Supreme Court’s 
robust neutrality between good and bad ideas. 
A more hopeful alternative, of course, is that the public will gradually 
inoculate itself against online manipulation, much as it eventually did with 
respect to earlier forms of propaganda.  As we adjust to a new world in which 
truth is less apparent on the face of things, new antibodies may develop in 
the body politic.  The public may grow more skeptical, and thus less gullible; 
new intermediaries and objective measures of validity may emerge as well.   
In the meantime, though, proposals to regulate political falsehoods might 
well gain greater traction, and perhaps even a sympathetic audience among 
some judges.  Some new regulations in the internet context might even be 
prudent.  Given their effective functioning as public forums rather than 
private advocates, some evenhanded regulation of social media platforms 
might be consistent with First Amendment principles.  Likewise, some form 
of disclosure requirement for micro-targeted advertising, so as to facilitate its 
exposure and rebuttal, might be justifiable, and so might some general 
restrictions on particular deceptive techniques, such as use of the new voice-
simulation technology to manufacture fake recordings, or swapping of photos 
from other contexts into fake stories about current events.  Finally, speech by 
hostile overseas actors need not necessarily receive the same protection 
afforded to citizens and domestic speakers. 
Yet going beyond such measures and restricting political falsehoods more 
generally, though an option current case law does not entirely rule out,100 
might well open the door to selective repression of the false assertions those in 
power at any given time perceive to be most damaging.101  To be blunt about 	
 100 Compare United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Were the Court to 
hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any 
evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad 
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.”), with id. at 
732 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The dangers of suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, as here, 
the regulations concern false statements about easily verifiable facts that do not concern such subject 
matter.  Such false factual statements are less likely than are true factual statements to make a 
valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”), and Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) 
(“Of course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same man-
ner as truthful statements.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)). 
 101 Cf. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“The mere potential for the exercise of [censorial 
power over false statements] casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, 
thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”); BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 
536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (noting that “while false statements may be unprotected for their own 
sake, ‘[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that 
matters’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 	
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it, a free-floating power to restrict political assertions because they are false may 
well be attractive to those dismayed by a gullible electorate, but it is not a power 
we can entrust to a government we now know may be led by a President willing 
to selectively disparage even honest and legitimate criticism as “fake news.” 
B.  Hate’s New Disinhibition 
A second threat to expressive freedom emerging out of the recent election 
involves the apparent ongoing “disinhibition” of hateful expression.102  What-
ever his own views on race and religion, unabashedly bigoted, anti-Semitic, 
and anti-Islamic “alt-right” and “white nationalist” groups embraced Presi-
dent Trump as their own.103  One consequence was reemergence into public 
debate of openly racist views, not only online in various forms, but also in pub-
lic demonstrations.104  Meanwhile, high-profile acts of hate-motivated vandal-
ism and violence following the election have stoked fears that this rising invec-
tive may have tangible consequences.105  Combining the two trends, a recent 
white nationalist demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia led to a terroristic 
attack on counter-protesters that killed one individual and injured others.106 
Racism, anti-Semitism, and the like are obviously not new to the United 
States, and much as with fake news, the real impact of these developments 
remains unclear.  Some have suggested it is better to have hateful views out 	
814 F.3d 466, 474–76 (6th Cir. 2016) (invalidating under strict scrutiny a state law restricting certain 
election-related false statements); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(same).  For an argument that some narrow restrictions on false election-related speech may remain 
permissible under Alvarez, see Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 
74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 56–57 (2013). 
 102 The source of this phrase appears to be John Marshall, The Great Disinhibition, TALKING POINTS 
MEMO (Nov. 18, 2016, 10:57 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/the-great-disinhibition. 
 103 See, e.g., Graeme Wood, His Kampf, ATLANTIC, June 2017, at 40, 43, 51 (discussing “alt-right” leader 
Richard Spencer’s support for Trump’s candidacy); Sarah Posner & David Neiwert, How Trump 
Took Hate Groups Mainstream, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.moth-
erjones.com/politics/2016/10/donald-trump-hate-groups-neo-nazi-white-supremacist-racism 
(noting online approval of Trump by neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, and white nationalist 
websites). 
 104 See, e.g., White Supremacy: Are US Right-Wing Groups on the Rise?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40915356 (assessing the strength of far-right groups 
and discussing their online activity and public rally in Charlottesville, Virginia). 
 105 See, e.g., G. Reginald Daniel & Jasmine Kelekay, From Loving v. Virginia to Barack Obama: The Sym-
bolic Tie that Binds, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 663–65 (2017) (listing “bomb threats to Jewish 
community centers and synagogues across the nation,” the burning of mosques, and requests “for 
the genocide of liberals and deportation of Jewish people” as results of Trump’s political ascent). 
 106 Joe Heim, Ellie Silverman, T. Rees Shapiro & Emma Brown, One Dead as Car Strikes Crowds Amid 
Protests of White Nationalist Gathering in Charlottesville; Two Police Die in Helicopter Crash, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/fights-in-advance-of-saturday-protest-
in-charlottesville/2017/08/12/155fb636-7f13-11e7-83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?utm_term=. 
7df3bc9a2f83. 	
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in the open than swept under the rug.107  Furthermore, important efforts are 
being made to return hate groups to the fringes where they belong.108   Only 
time will tell whether we are witnessing a real retrogression in public attitudes 
or only an atavistic spasm that will recede as quickly as it arose. 
Again as with fake news, though, perceptions may be at least as important 
as realities.  Simply put, if people feel menaced by hate groups, they will be less 
willing to brush off expression of threatening ideas.  Already, serious arguments 
exist for withdrawing First Amendment protection from some narrow category 
of hate speech, as indeed is done in other western democracies and once 
appeared to be the law in the United States.109  Such arguments may well gain 
momentum if the problem of hateful expression grows more salient and direct 
prohibitions on hate-motivated violence or discrimination are perceived as 
ineffective means of combatting it.  At the same time, continued political 
success of figures lauded by bigoted groups could heighten calls for counter-
majoritarian constitutional protection against their hateful advocacy. 
More immediately, at any rate, hard cases might well generate pressure 
for incremental expansion of existing standards for unprotected threats and 
incitement.  Although the Supreme Court has narrowly defined the standard 
for “true threats,” the standard’s application badly divided the Supreme 
Court in its last major threats case.110  Some lower court opinions, moreover, 
have controversially applied the standard to allow suppression of violent 
online advocacy.111  For its part, the Brandenburg incitement test, though de-
signed to tightly constrain the domain of unprotected subversive advocacy, 	
 107 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 43, at 162 (“One of the arguments for allowing hateful speech is that it 
makes the rest of us aware of terrible beliefs and strengthens our resolve to combat them.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Arnel Hecimovic, Anti-Racist Rallies Across the United States—In Pictures, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/gallery/2017/aug/14/anti-racist-rallies-across-
the-united-states-in-pictures (reporting rallies responding to the white supremacist demonstration 
in Charlottesville). 
 109 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 3–6 (2012) (arguing against the protec-
tion of hate speech). 
 110 In Virginia v. Black, one majority on the Court held that a burning cross could constitute an unpro-
tected “true threat,” while a different majority nonetheless invalidated a statutory provision treating 
cross burnings as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.  See 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“Re-
spondents do not contest that some cross burnings fit within this meaning of intimidating speech, 
and rightly so.”); id. at 365 (plurality opinion) (holding that the prima facie provision “would create 
an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas” because “[t]he act of burning a cross may mean 
that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation” or “only that the person is 
engaged in core political speech” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. at 386 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“To the extent the prima facie evidence provision skews prosecutions, then, 
it skews the statute toward suppressing ideas.”).  More recently, in Elonis v. United States, the Court 
reversed a conviction under a federal threats statute where the speaker’s intent was ambiguous, but 
the Court did so on statutory grounds without reaching First Amendment issues.  135 S. Ct. 2001, 
2004, 2007–12 (2015). 
 111 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding a damages judgment and injunction against a 	
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could conceivably expand in application to cover more hateful invective if 
such advocacy’s effects come to seem more immediate.  As discussed below, 
in the terrorism context the Supreme Court may have already opened a doc-
trinal pathway for an end run around Brandenburg altogether when risks of 
violence appear grave enough.112 
Again, how best to design the doctrine in these areas as a matter of first 
principles is not my topic here.  Nevertheless, the history highlighted earlier 
should make clear that weakening existing near-absolute protection for ex-
pression of ideas could carry perils for minorities and dissidents of all stripes, 
not just retrograde white supremacists.  Unambiguous protection for bigoted 
expression arose during a period when it served the evident corollary func-
tion of shielding civil rights advocates from bigoted government repression.  
To the extent we are indeed undergoing a revival of prejudice—a period in 
which perceived white grievances have gained new political traction, and of-
ficials of different parties may have quite distinct intuitions about what advo-
cacy is most threatening and offensive—that protection may be more im-
portant than it has been as well.113 
C.  The Terrorism Problem 
A last source of pressure for change could come from the ongoing threat of 
ideological terrorism and political violence.  As the September 11 attacks and 
the many incidents here and abroad since then demonstrate, the United States 
and other western democracies face a persistent terrorist threat from groups 
and individuals motivated by radical jihadist beliefs.  At the same time, newly 
emboldened anti-government militias and domestic terrorist groups could pose 
new threats to public safety as well,114 and recent incidents, including violence 
at public demonstrations and a politically-motivated murderous assault on Re-
publican members of Congress and their staff, raise fears that the rising ten-
sions in our divided polity could yield a new season of political violence.115 	
pro-life website that listed abortion providers and crossed out the names of those who had been 
murdered); id. at 1089–92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for ignoring the narrow 
limits on the standard for true threats). 
 112 See infra Part III.C. 
 113 If this concern seems abstract, consider that a leaked recent FBI intelligence report identifies a 
putative movement of “black identity extremists” as a significant threat to law enforcement.  Jana 
Winter & Sharon Weinberger, The FBI’s New U.S. Terrorist Threat: ‘Black Identity Extremists,’ FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Oct. 6, 2017, 11:42 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/06/the-fbi-has-identified-a-
new-domestic-terrorist-threat-and-its-black-identity-extremists/. 
 114 See Jared A. Goldstein, To Kill and Die for the Constitution: Nullification and Insurrectionary Violence, in 
NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 179, 209–10, 215–
20 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016) (discussing anti-government groups’ violent ideology and growing 
strength). 
 115 See Peter Beinart, The Rise of the Violent Left, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2017, at 13–15 (describing the violent 	
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Terrorism and political violence, sadly, are also not new problems.  What 
makes them noteworthy here is that they are ideologically motivated.  As a 
result, restricting advocacy may appear to be a congenial solution to the 
violence itself, particularly if attacks prove difficult or impossible to prevent.  
Already, other western countries proscribe broader categories of incendiary 
speech than our Supreme Court’s Brandenburg test allows.116  Even our Supreme 
Court, moreover, recently opened up a possible pathway to upholding speech-
restrictive anti-terrorism laws without confronting Brandenburg head on.  In 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that a federal law could validly 
prohibit providing “material support” (which the Court assumed could include 
advice and expert assistance) to designated foreign terrorist groups, even for 
non-terrorist purposes of the organization.117  The Court reached this result, 
however, not by applying any First Amendment exception or even by 
characterizing the regulated support as a form of “conduct,” but instead by 
applying the “more demanding standard” applicable to laws that “regulate[ ] 
speech on the basis of its content” and yet still deferring to Congress’s judgment 
that the law was necessary to achieve compelling anti-terrorism purposes.118 
As Eugene Volokh has argued, this type of strict-scrutiny end run around 
the categorical exceptions is a potential Achilles’ heel to those categories’ 
narrow definitions.119  Preventing violent crime is a government purpose of 
the highest order, and it is not always obvious that punishing such crimes or 
their planning after the fact is a less restrictive means of preventing them than 
is limiting their advocacy or encouragement.120  The Brandenburg test’s doc-
trinal function is thus not only to limit the domain of unprotected incitement, 
but also to cut off arguments that restricting political advocacy outside the 
test’s narrow bounds may be justified under strict scrutiny.121  Humanitarian 	
“Antifa” movement committed to countering right-wing protest activities); Peter Hermann, Amber 
Phillips, Paul Kane & Rachel Weiner, Lawmaker Steve Scalise is Critically Injured in GOP Baseball Shooting; 
Gunman James T. Hodgkinson is Killed by Police, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/local/public-safety/multiple-people-injured-after-shooting-in-alexandria/2017/06/ 
14/0289c768-50f6-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term-=.6fcada4035ae (recounting 
the shooting of Republican congressmen by “[a] man angry with President Trump”). 
 116 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Free Speech and the Incitement of Violence or Unlawful Behavior: Statutes Directed at 
Speech, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 146, 156–61, 164–65 (Vikram David 
Amar & Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2009) (describing European and British law on incitement and 
comparing it with that of the United States). 
 117 561 U.S. 1, 39–40 (2010). 
 118 Id. at 27–28, 35–36, 39–40 (quoting Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)). 
 119 Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2417, 2441, 2444 (1996). 
 120 Id. at 2436. 
 121 Id. at 2445; cf. Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WISC. L. 
REV. 115, 206 (characterizing Brandenburg’s “concrete definition of harm and imposition of causa-
tion requirements” as designed to “make[ ] evasion more difficult and force[ ] jurists to take a sober 
second look at their thought processes before coming to a conclusion” (footnote omitted) (citing 	
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Law Project could prove significant if it has cracked open the door to this type 
of defense for anti-terrorism legislation targeting speech or speech-related ac-
tivities.  Humanitarian Law Project, to be sure, was a peculiar case.  Infused with 
concerns about congressional foreign affairs powers that are normally absent 
in domestic disputes, the decision need not be read broadly.122  But if terror-
ism fears find a political outlet in more repressive domestic counter-terrorism 
legislation, the government is sure to push an expansive reading of Humani-
tarian Law Project in defending the statute.123 
As with other topics addressed earlier, my main objective here is not to 
take any firm view on the correct standard for unprotected incitement.124  As 
a matter of first principles, balancing expressive freedom against imperatives 
of personal and government security may be a hard problem, one that re-
quires different standards in different societal contexts.  As with fake news 
and hate speech, however, weakening First Amendment protections in the 
current partisan context could easily send us skidding down a quite slippery 
slope.  Overheated rhetoric is endemic to the filter-bubbles and echo-cham-
bers of the internet.  Sorting fits of pique from genuine threats is already a 
challenge for law enforcement, one that could only be complicated by forcing 
expression of extreme opinion deeper underground.125  At any rate, if we 
open the door to punishing the advocacy itself without any tight standard of 
immediacy such as Brandenburg’s, there may well be targets enough to go 
around—and state and federal prosecutors with different political inclina-
tions could find themselves competing to root out each side’s angriest ele-
ments.126  At the least, historical experience under the Supreme Court’s more 
permissive pre-Brandenburg “clear and present danger” test suggests that even 	
Paul Horwitz,  Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 47 (2003))). 
 122 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 35 (emphasizing that “[i]n this litigation,” unlike domestic 
free speech precedents, “Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to make principled 
distinctions between activities that will further terrorist conduct and undermine United States for-
eign policy, and those that will not”).  For a narrow interpretation and defense of the decision, see 
Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 670–75, 697–707 (2017).  
For a critique that advocates confining the case to its facts, see David Cole, The First Amendment’s 
Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 147, 149–50 (2012). 
 123 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for “fail[ing] 
to examine the Government’s justifications with sufficient care”). 
 124 For a thoughtful recent discussion of restrictions on online terrorist advocacy that current case law 
might allow, see Tsesis, supra note 122, at 664, 667, 670, 684, 692. 
 125 See, e.g., David Gray et. al, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 745, 788 (2013) (“Cyberharassment is a widespread and growing challenge for law 
enforcement in the United States.”). 
 126 Again, as one illustration of the sorts of advocacy that some might seek to prosecute, consider the 
FBI’s recent identification of “black identity extremists” as a significant public safety threat.  See 
Winter & Weinberger, supra note 113. 	
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fairly mild forms of anti-government protest could be targeted for repression 
in an environment of public fear and military mobilization.127 
D.  Corrosive Political Dynamics and Doctrinal Downward Spirals 
In each of these areas, then, societal pressure for greater speech restriction 
could conceivably find a doctrinal outlet, yet in each case doing so could con-
ceivably backfire on some groups most inclined at present to advocate it.  
However worthy the goal, if we begin attempting to cleanse public debate of 
falsity, hatred, and illiberalism, there will be defendants enough to go around, 
and the targets of repression might often turn as much on the political affini-
ties of the prosecutor as on the real dangerousness of the speech in question. 
A last concern to consider, moreover, is that doctrinal evolution along 
any of these fronts could increase pressure for movement along the others as 
well.  Though there is room for partisan application within each category, 
the topics I highlighted have rough political valences, at least in the immedi-
ate political context.  As a rough generalization, fake news and media frag-
mentation is at present a predominantly liberal concern, and regulating hate 
speech likewise appeals mostly to progressive groups; on the other hand, alt-
hough terrorism is certainly a bipartisan fear, conservatives at present appear 
most likely to advocate harsh additional legal measures, at least with respect 
to jihadist groups.128  This context could magnify the dynamics already 
noted.  Eugene Volokh has noted the psychological phenomenon of “censor-
ship envy”: repression of speech others fear can promote arguments that, out 
of fairness, speech one fears oneself should likewise be repressed.129  As a 
political matter, that seems likely in the contexts addressed here: regulating 
left-wing radicalism would make it harder to justify tolerating right-wing rad-
icalism (and vice versa). 	
 127 See, e.g., STONE, supra note 43, at 208–11 (discussing the Supreme Court’s speech-restrictive under-
standing of the test during the World War I period); see also id. at 13 (noting a general historical 
pattern of going “too far in sacrificing civil liberties—especially the freedom of speech”—during 
periods of national-security emergency); Wells, supra note 121, at 119 (offering a case study of anti-
communist prosecutions to “explore[ ] the psychological influences that may lead judges to suc-
cumb to fear and prejudice in times of crisis and, consequently, to abdicate their judicial role”). 
 128 See, e.g., David M. Jackson, Trump Advocates Waterboarding and ‘Much Worse’ to Battle Terrorists, USA 
TODAY (June 29, 2016) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/ 
06/29/donald-trump-istanbul-airport-attack-hillary-clinton/86504460/ (reporting “aggressive 
rhetoric” by then-candidate Donald Trump). 
 129 Eugene Volokh, Censorship Envy, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/16/censorship-envy/ 
?ut-m_term=.8281d4d2248c; see also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1026, 1059–61 (2003) (describing “censorship envy,” which is what happens “when a free 
speech exception is created for one constituency” as opposed to another, and those “others may 
resent even more the absence of an exception for their own favored cause”). 	
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Judges and justices should be less susceptible to this type of response than 
others.  But the judiciary is sharply divided as well, and judges and justices 
from different parties may well share some differences in perception of relative 
dangerousness reflected in public opinion at large.  As a result, self-reinforcing 
downward spirals could be possible in doctrinal evolution as well, possibly 
even without judges being aware of them.  At the least, we have been through 
periods of constitutional retrogression before, most notably during the slow 
judicial abandonment of racial equality at the close of Reconstruction.130 
Ever since it took hold several decades ago, our First Amendment abso-
lutism has been largely self-reinforcing: it has promoted cases and arguments 
that further expand the First Amendment’s coverage, building out an ever-
more elaborate structure of expressive protections.131  But the same sort of 
process could also work in reverse.  Acute current problems, such as those I 
have highlighted here, could yield a set of cases and arguments in which fa-
miliar First Amendment platitudes stick in the throat.  But if precedent moves 
in a less protective direction, and if we do not think carefully in advance 
about future lines of argument and principled responses to them, we might 
find several decades hence that not only the structure’s outer emanations, but 
also the First Amendment bedrock itself is chipped and cracked in ways we 
scarcely anticipated when the process began. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever its merits as a matter of first principles, our country’s distinctive 
approach to expressive freedom has been a point of broad judicial consensus.  
In all likelihood, it will remain so.  But in this fevered political season, it seems 
worth giving thought to the historical circumstances that generated this con-
sensus and how current circumstances might cause it to erode. 
As I have tried to sketch briefly here, current doctrine reflects a particular 
emphasis on neutrality between ideas that took hold during a period when 
civil rights protesters and other progressive groups were obvious prime ben-
eficiaries of this understanding.  Ever since, this absolutist approach has guar-
anteed freedom for radicals and dissidents of all stripes to express even dan-
gerous and despicable ideas—and in doing so the doctrine has anchored an 
unambiguous protection for the rest of us to express our own views without 
fear of government repression.  A central question today is how, if at all, this 
understanding should adapt to the new challenges of our time, including the 
three I have highlighted here: (1) new communications technologies and their 	
 130 For recent analysis of this history, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 184–205 (2011); 2 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 426–31, 491, 493–94 (2016). 
 131 Schauer, supra note 72, at 1625–28. 
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power to propagate falsity as well as truth; (2) apparent reinvigoration of big-
oted and hateful groups and ideas; and (3) ongoing threats of ideologically 
motivated terrorism and political violence. 
These are all hard problems that will require thoughtful responses by 
courts, governments, and citizens in the years ahead.  In this brief Article, I 
have tried only to highlight how the current partisan context may make cer-
tain speech-repressive solutions to these problems both more appealing than 
they have been in the past, but also potentially more perilous.  In a sharply 
divided polity with deep differences over what speech is most threatening or 
offensive, any new equilibrium is unlikely to favor one side or the other un-
ambiguously.  Instead, weakening the current expansive approach will open 
doors for repressive forces on both sides to hunt their own preferred quarry. 
We appear to be on a downward spiral in other areas of our political life.  
We should take care to avoid one here.  In this season of dissent and distrust, 
the right to advocate any idea, however offensive, distasteful, or dangerous, 
remains an important underpinning of democratic self-government.  It is a 
heritage we abandon at our peril. 
 
